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CAFA AND ERIE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL

CONSEQUENCES?
Justin D. Forlenza*
INTRODUCTION

Imagine a statute that provides that every class action involving any one
plaintiff and any one defendant from different states, where the aggregate
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, must be adjudicated in federal
court and cannot be heard in state court. 1 This statute would force all class
actions where any one class member is diverse from any defendant, and the
aggregate class members' claims exceed $5,000,000, into federal court.
However, all of these class actions would be governed by state substantive
law. 2 This hypothetical statute is very similar to the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAFA). 3 The two statutes differ only in that CAFA does not
explicitly create exclusive federal jurisdiction over such interstate class
actions. However, as this Note will argue, CAFA's practical effect will be
to cause federal courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over some
interstate class actions. Consequently, CAFA raises several questions:
Does CAFA comport with Article III of the U.S. Constitution's limited

* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would first like to thank my
parents for all their love and support throughout the years. Thank you to Professor Thomas
H. Lee for his indispensable advice and guidance throughout the writing process. Thank you
to the Fordham Law Review editorial board and staff for their excellent editing assistance.
Finally, special thanks to Jessica Grace Siegel, without whose invaluable assistance,
encouragement, and support this Note would never have been written.
1. This would be an example of exclusive federal jurisdiction. As a threshold matter,
Congress possesses the power to mandate exclusive federal court jurisdiction over those
situations enumerated in Article III. 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3527 (2d ed. 2006).
2. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (noting that a federal court
sitting in diversity can apply federal procedural law, but "Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a [s]tate..."). Because jurisdiction over this
type of class action is predicated upon diversity, state substantive law controls the decision.
See id.; see also Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the Unites States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.").
3. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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4
grant of diversity jurisdiction? Does CAFA contravene the Erie doctrine?
5
Does CAFA conflict with the Rules of Decision Act?
CAFA does not appear to directly violate Article III. Article III grants
federal courts jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies ...between Citizens of
different States."'6 CAFA is most likely consistent with Article III because
it only extends federal jurisdiction over class actions in which any one
defendant is a citizen of a different state than any one plaintiff. 7 Courts
have consistently held that the "complete diversity" doctrine espoused by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Strawbridgev. Curtiss,8 which mandates that
all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants, 9 was a decision
interpreting the First Judiciary Act of 1789 and not Article III's Diversity
Clause. 10
The U.S. Supreme Court has further held that it is constitutionally
permissible for Congress to extend federal jurisdiction over minimally
diverse parties in complex litigation. 1'
CAFA, therefore, is a
constitutionally valid extension of Article
III
diversity
jurisdiction over
12
minimally diverse interstate class actions.

4. See generally Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
6. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
7. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) ("Article III
poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so
long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.").
8. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
9. Diversity jurisdiction would be improper under the First Judiciary Act if a plaintiff
and a defendant were citizens of the same state. See id.
10. See id. at 267 (interpreting "the words.., of [C]ongress" in section 11 of the First
Judiciary Act to require complete diversity). Note that the wording of the First Judiciary Act
was different than the current diversity statute: "The circuit courts shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at
common law... where.., the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. This
seems to imply that the original diversity statute was intended to cover just those situations
where a defendant would be haled into a potentially biased state tribunal. Where there are
two parties from the same state on either side of the suit, the risk of prejudice against the outof-state citizen is counteracted by the presence of an identically situated state citizen, and
federal jurisdiction is not warranted. See 13B Wright et al., supra note 1, § 3605 ("[The]
justification for granting federal diversity jurisdiction does not apply to cases in which there
are citizens from the same state on opposing sides of the litigation.").
11. "Minimal diversity" occurs where any one defendant is the citizen of a different state
than any one plaintiff. See State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 (holding that the interpleader statute,
which requires only minimal diversity between any two claimants, is a constitutional
exercise of diversity jurisdiction under Article i1); see also 13B Wright et al., supra note 1,
§ 3605 ("The [State Farm] decision holds only that complete diversity is not required by the
Constitution in all cases."). At least one commentator has suggested that there may be
constitutional problems with minimal diversity. See C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of
Minimal Diversity, 55 Hastings L.J. 613 (2004). However, it is hard to see how the plain
meaning of the language in the Constitution itself requires complete diversity.
12. This statute may, however, extend diversity jurisdiction beyond its narrow reach
contemplated and intended by the framers, most notably Alexander Hamilton. See The
Federalist No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (stressing that the main rationale for diversity
jurisdiction is to prevent out-of-state litigants from prejudice in state court). For an
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Even though CAFA does not clash with the text of Article III, CAFA is
incompatible with the Erie doctrine. 13 It is probable that some areas of
14
state substantive law are only adjudicated in the form of class actions,
because it is unlikely that individual plaintiffs will bring actions involving
small individual claims, such as consumer protection
or products liability
15
actions, on their own behalf as individual suits.
CAFA, in effect, restricts jurisdiction over state law consumer protection
and products liability class actions to federal court. 16 As a result, state
courts will never have the opportunity to interpret and develop the
substantive law in those areas. CAFA's practical effect will be to usurp the
state judiciary's primary role of creating and developing the substantive law
in those areas. Thus, the statute will force federal courts to create and
develop substantive federal common law. 17
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Court held that it is
unconstitutional for federal courts sitting in diversity to create substantive
common law, 18 stating that neither Congress nor the federal courts have the
"power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
[s]tate."' 19 Consequently, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state
20
substantive law.
Because CAFA is based on diversity jurisdiction, state substantive law
will govern all of the class actions under its purview. 2 1 However, because
CAFA restricts jurisdiction over these class actions exclusively to federal
court, the federal courts will lack applicable state law and be forced to
develop a federal common law of class actions. 22 Accordingly, CAFA will
argument that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) exceeds the policy rationale for
diversity jurisdiction, see infra Part III.C.
13. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
14. See infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text.
15. This Note is concerned with state laws that provide plaintiffs the right to recover for
small individual damage claims. These claims are unlikely to be brought by individuals and
will only be interpreted in the context of class actions, yet the state court system will lack
jurisdiction over those class actions. Consider, for example, a Florida class action suit filed
last December against The Home Depot, alleging that The Home Depot overcharged
customers by adding a 10% damage waiver fee to equipment rentals. Julie Kay, Home Depot
Fights Challenge to Fee for Damage Waiver, Miami Daily Bus. Rev., Dec. 29, 2005,
available at http://www.law.comljsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1135850712531.
The
named plaintiff in that suit alleged damages of a 10% waiver fee on his $39 bill. Id. It is
unlikely that any plaintiff would sue individually over $3.90.
16. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005, 80
Tul. L. Rev. 1593, 1608 (2006) ("After CAFA, the federal courts are essentially 'the only
game in town' for multistate and national class actions.").
17. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1419-20 (2006).
18. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several
states ... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States .... "); see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
22. See Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1419-20.
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force federal courts to violate the core constitutional holding of Erie
because the federal
courts do not have any constitutional authority to create
23
substantive law.
Erie also established the proposition that the Rules of Decision Act
requires federal courts to apply state law, including state judicial decisions,
as the rules of decision in all U.S. courts. 24 Because CAFA, in practice,
removes the state court system's jurisdiction over some state law class
actions, state courts will be unable to create state decisional case law.
Consequently, CAFA may force federal judges to create and apply federal
"rules of decision" in diversity class actions, which transgresses both the
25
Rules of Decision Act and the Court's holding in Erie.
Part I of this Note provides a brief historical background of federal class
actions. It introduces CAFA and describes how CAFA changes the federal
diversity 26 and removal 27 statutes. Part II first describes Congress's
concerns over class action abuses, and then outlines how CAFA addresses
those concerns. Part II then analyzes and describes the potential problems
that CAFA creates. It first introduces the theory of "Procedural Swift," and
then describes how this theory applies to CAFA. Next, this section
addresses whether CAFA conflicts with the Erie doctrine, and whether
CAFA forces federal courts to violate either the Rules of Decision Act
(RDA) or the Rules Enabling Act (REA). Finally, this section also
discusses whether principles of federalism adequately justify CAFA's
extension of diversity jurisdiction over class actions.
Part III argues that CAFA conflicts with the core constitutional holding
of Erie because it forces federal courts to create state substantive common
law in certain areas. Part III also contends that CAFA extends diversity
jurisdiction over class action suits beyond the scope intended by the
framers. Part III further asserts that in passing CAFA, Congress breached
several key principles of democratic legitimacy. Finally, the conclusion
offers federal district courts practical solutions to minimize CAFA's impact
on the sovereignty of state courts.
I. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: A BREAK FROM THE PAST

A. HistoricalBackgroundof FederalClass Actions
The class action is a time-honored and venerable practice in U.S. legal
history. It is "a uniquely Anglo-American invention" that is relatively
unheard of in other legal systems. 2 8 In America, the modem class action
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2005).
Id. § 1453 (West 2005).

28. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalizationof the

InterstateClass Action, 46 S. Tex. L. Rev. 391, 398 (2004).
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began to take shape in the mid-nineteenth century. 29 Class actions were
based on the concept that multiple parties could be joined together in one
litigation if they shared common legal or factual issues. 30 By the twentieth
31
century, class actions were well entrenched in the American legal system.
In 1938, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 Rule
23 of the Federal Rules governs class action certification. 3 3 In 1966,
Congress amended Rule 23 to its current form. 34 In order to certify a class
and allow a suit to proceed in federal court, federal judges must find that all
of Rule 23's requirements are satisfied. To satisfy Rule 23's requirements,
plaintiffs must show that
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
parties will fairly and
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
35
adequately protect the interests of the class.
Rule 23(b) delineates the three types of class actions, which differ
depending on the kind of relief sought. Rule 23(b)(1) governs situations
where
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class

.

.

.

or (B)

adjudications... which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications .... 36
Rule 23(b)(2) controls in situations where multiple plaintiffs37seek injunctive
or other equitable relief, such as in civil rights class actions.
The major change to federal class actions came in 1966, when Congress
amended Rule 23 to allow plaintiffs to use the class action device to obtain
monetary damages. 3 8 Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes the "damage" class action,
where a group of plaintiffs jointly seeks monetary relief. Rule 23(b)(3)
requires that the trial judge find legal or factual questions common to all
class members and that these common questions dominate the individual

29. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7 (noting that the

Field Code required only that multiple parties share "a common interest in law or fact").
30. Professor Stephen Yeazell traces the development of the class action device back to
medieval England, where there are records of group litigation. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past
and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev.
687, 687-90 (1997).
31. See id.
32. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7.
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
34. See Yeazell, supra note 30, at 696.
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); see also Underwood, supra note 28, at 400.
38. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7; see also
Yeazell, supra note 30, at 696.

1070

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

claims of class members. 39 The trial judge must also find that the class
device is a "fair and efficient" way to settle the class members' claims. 40
41
Rule 23(b)(3) is the most controversial provision of Rule 23. Critics of
the class action device argue that Rule 23(b)(3) was never intended to
handle mass toxic torts and products liability cases. 42 They maintain that
Rule 23(b)(3) has opened the judicial floodgates to allow mass tort cases
into the federal court system, cases that the system is simply not designed
or equipped to handle. 4 3 Congress shared the critics' concerns with mass
tort class actions and found that state judges were applying certification
standards improperly.44 As a result, Congress attempted to narrow the state
court system's power to adjudicate interstate class actions by passing
CAFA. 45 CAFA reformed the current class action system by altering the
diversity jurisdiction statute's citizenship and amount-in-controversy
requirements with respect to class actions. These changes, in effect, cause
more class actions to be heard in federal court.
B. Diversity Jurisdictionand Class Actions
In order for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over any action, Article
46
III of the Constitution must grant the federal courts the power to hear it.
Article III grants the federal courts diversity jurisdiction over "cases ...or
controversies.., between Citizens of different States."' 47 CAFA now
bestows the federal courts jurisdiction over class actions where at least one
plaintiff is from a different state than any one defendant. 48 This section
traces the development of federal diversity jurisdiction over interstate class
actions through the twentieth century before and after CAFA.
1. Section 1332 Diversity Jurisdiction Requirements and Strawbridge
Prior to CAFA's enactment, jurisdiction over interstate class actions was
based on the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The prevailing rationale
for diversity jurisdiction was that out-of-state litigants faced the risk of bias
when either pursuing or defending a claim in the state court where the

39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
40. Id.
41. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 7, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
42. See id. at 8, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9.
43. See id. at 6, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7 (asserting that the federal courts
should apply the four requirements mandated by Rule 23 strictly, in order to dissuade
opportunistic plaintiffs' lawyers from utilizing the class action device to bring these kinds of
claims).
44. See id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7.
45. See id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7.
46. The federal courts arc courts of limited jurisdiction that can hear only those cases or
controversies enumerated in Article III of the Constitution. See 13B Wright et al., supra note
1,§ 3522.
47. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
48. This is often referred to as "minimal diversity."
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adverse party was a citizen. 4 9 The solution to the risk of bias against out-

of-state citizens was diversity jurisdiction. Federal courts could provide
an
50
impartial forum for out-of-state litigants to assert their grievances.
In simple litigation, where there is one plaintiff and one defendant, the
diversity statute is easy to apply. The plaintiff must be from a different
state than the defendant. One question that arose early in the nation's
history was how federal courts should apply the diversity jurisdiction
requirement to complex litigation. 5 1 Would each defendant have to reside
in a different state than each plaintiff, or would diversity of citizenship

between any one plaintiff and any one defendant suffice to support federal
jurisdiction? In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, Chief Justice Marshall answered
this question and declared that in complex litigation, each plaintiff must be

able to establish diversity jurisdiction over each defendant, a principle
'52
known as "complete diversity.
Some commentators argue that complete diversity is simply a policy
decision that balances the limited resources of the federal court system

against the likelihood of state courts' prejudicial treatment against out-ofstate citizens.5 3 In complex litigation, the traditional policy rationale for
diversity jurisdiction is weakened when there are citizens of the same state
on either side of the litigation; in that case the biases will "cancel out" and
neither side will be prejudiced. 54 Complete diversity simply limits the
amount of cases that federal courts will hear.
After Strawbridge, the question remained whether complete diversity
was compelled by Article III of the Constitution. One hundred and fifty
years later, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Strawbridge decision

was an interpretation of the diversity statute and not an interpretation of

49. See 13B Wright et al., supra note 1, § 3605.
50. See id. § 3601 ("[T]he traditional, and most often cited, explanation of the purpose
of diversity jurisdiction [is] the fear that state courts would be prejudiced against out-of-state
litigants.").
5 1. By "complex litigation," this Note refers to suits that involve more than two parties.
52. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (holding that each
plaintiff must have a citizenship different from each defendant to support jurisdiction under
the diversity statute).
53. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of JudicialBusiness Between State
and Federal Courts: FederalJurisdictionand "The Martian Chronicles," 78 Va. L. Rev.
1769, 1803-06 (1992) (noting that in Strawbridge, "[Chief Justice John] Marshall made
absolutely no effort to discern complete diversity from either the text or policies of the
diversity statute," but the rule can be justified because "it effectively controls the number of
diversity cases that can be brought in federal court"). For an argument that the complete
diversity requirement does not efficiently implement the policies it is supposedly driven by
and is therefore an arbitrary policy centered on reducing the federal caseload, see generally
id. and David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part 1,36 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1968).
54. See Redish, supra note 53, at 1803-06; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors v. Nat'l Real
Estate Ass'n. 894 F.2d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The rationale for requiring complete
diversity is that the presence of residents of the same state on both sides of the lawsuit
neutralizes any bias in favor of residents ....
").
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Article III.55 The text of Article III simply states, "The judicial power shall
extend... to controversies... between Citizens of different States. '56 The
Court, applying a plain meaning analysis, reasoned that nothing in the
clause itself requires complete diversity. Consequently, the Court held that
the federal courts may assert diversity jurisdiction over minimally diverse
57
parties.
2. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur and Diversity over Class Actions
After Strawbridge, it was still unclear how the diversity jurisdiction
58
statute applied to class actions. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble
the Court resolved this issue. In Ben-Hur, the Court interpreted the
diversity statute to require that all named representative plaintiffs and all
named defendants be completely diverse. 59 Therefore, after Ben-Hur, in a
diversity class action, all representative plaintiffs and all representative
60
defendants had to be completely diverse.
Because the Court chose not to inquire into the citizenship status of
unnamed class members, Ben-Hur was a decidedly pro-federal class action
decision. A plaintiffs' class may have contained unnamed members who
were citizens of the same state as a defendant. If the court considered those
class members in determining whether complete diversity existed, it would
have defeated federal jurisdiction. Thus, Ben-Hur expanded the federal
61
courts' purview over diversity class actions.

55. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that the
interpleader statute's requirement of minimal diversity between any two adverse claimants
satisfies the constitutional diversity requirement of Article III); Redish, supra note 53, at
1803.
56. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
57. See State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531.
58. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
59. Id. at 366 (holding that the intervention of Indiana plaintiffs, who were not among
the named representatives of the class, would not defeat diversity jurisdiction because
diversity jurisdiction is determined based on the representative parties).
60. That is to say, all named plaintiffs must be diverse from all named defendants. BenHur, 255 U.S. at 366.
61. Whether the complete diversity rule actually makes sense with respect to class
actions is another matter. After Ben-Hur, a federal court could have been faced with a
scenario where in a major interstate class action, one out of one thousand plaintiffs was from
the same state as one defendant, and the district court would be forced to remand the matter
to state court. Even though that state's substantive laws may have governed the case, it is far
from clear that the state truly had a greater interest in adjudicating the class action than any
other state affected by the alleged improper activity, or a state where a significant number of
plaintiffs are citizens. This is precisely the reason why the Senate argued it was necessary to
apply the less stringent minimal diversity standards to class actions. See infra Part II.A. This
Note argues that the conflict between state and federal interests is a problem inherent to our
federal system and its distribution of power between national and state governments, and
further that, while perhaps not unconstitutional, Congress's solution with CAFA may be an
example of overreaching.
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3. Section 1332's Amount-in-Controversy Requirement and Zahn v.
InternationalPaper
In addition to diversity of citizenship, § 1332 has a second requirement:
the amount-in-controversy requirement. 62 Under § 1332, a plaintiff must
make a good-faith allegation that she suffered more than $75,000 in
damages. 63 Ben-Hur left one issue unresolved: Did each member of the
class have to allege damages in excess of the amount-in-controversy
requirement? 64 Or did only the named representative plaintiffs have to
allege the requisite amount in damages to satisfy the provisions of § 1332?
The Court answered these questions in Zahn v. InternationalPaper.65 In
Zahn, the Court held that in order to establish diversity jurisdiction in a
class action, each plaintiffs individual claim must satisfy the amount-incontroversy requirement. 66 Thus, each class member had to allege more
than $10,000 (the amount-in-controversy requirement at the time) in
67
damages.
The Zahn decision restricted federal court jurisdiction over class actions
by precluding federal courts from certifying classes where plaintiffs could
not allege sufficient damages. After Zahn, class actions based on claims
where the individual damage to each plaintiff was minimal were effectively
restricted to state courts. Zahn therefore represents the lowest ebb of the
federal court system's power to adjudicate diversity class actions.
4. Exxon-Mobil v. Allapattah, Section 1367, and the Expansion of Federal
Class Action Jurisdiction Power
After Zahn both Congress and the Supreme Court began to augment
federal jurisdiction over diversity class actions. In 1990, Congress passed
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides,
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under
68
Article III of the United States Constitution.
The supplemental jurisdiction statute grants federal courts the power to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction 6 9 over claims arising out of the same "case or
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
63. Id.
64. See id. (setting forth a $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement). At the time of
Zahn, the amount in controversy requirement was $10,000. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291, 293-94 (1973).
65. 414 U.S. 291.
66. Id. at 301.
67. Id.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
69. For a discussion of ancillary jurisdiction, see generally 7C Wright et al., supra note
1, § 1917.
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controversy" that a federal court has the constitutional authority to
adjudicate under Article II1.
The following hypothetical illustrates the types of claims that fall under
the purview of the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Assume there is an
auto accident in New York, where D hits both P1 and P2. P1, who is from
New York, sues D, who is from California, for a state law claim that
satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement. P2, also from New York,
seeks to join in the lawsuit, but P2 suffered damages less than the amountin-controversy requirement. Under § 1367(a), P2's claim arises out of the
same case or controversy as P1's does (the accident) and thus P2 will be
able to join P1 in suing D in federal court.
However, § 1367(b) places a further obstacle in P2's path. If P1 bases
his or her claim on the diversity statute, federal courts cannot exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over P2's claim if P2 was "made [a] part[y] under
Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24."7 0 Consequently, in all diversity suits where parties
seek to be joined under these rules, each individual plaintiff must allege
damages in excess of the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Conspicuously absent from § 1367(b) is Rule 23, the class action rule.
After Congress passed § 1367, the question remained whether it
overruled the Court's holding in Zahn that each member of a class had to
individually satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332. In
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,71 the Supreme Court held
that § 1367 overruled Zahn.72 Congress, by not including Rule 23 in §
1367, overruled Zahn's holding that each class member must satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement. 73 The Exxon Mobil Court found that
as long as at least one named class member satisfies the amount-incontroversy requirement and the other class members' claims form part of
the same Article III case or controversy, federal courts have supplemental
74
jurisdiction over the ancillary claims that do not satisfy the requirement.
Exxon Mobil significantly altered the scope of federal class actions based
on § 1332. As a result of Exxon Mobil, the ancillary claims of class
members no longer have to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, as
long as they form part of the same Article III case or controversy. Exxon
Mobil expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions founded on § 1332.
Now, small individual claims that form part of the same case or controversy
can be joined together in one class action in federal court. As the next
section explains, CAFA further expands federal jurisdiction over diversity

70. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
71. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
72. Id. at 2625.
73. Id. ("We hold that § 1367 by its plain text overruled... Zahn and authorized
supplemental iurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same Article III
case or controversy ....
74. Id. at 2615.
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class actions. 7 5 As a result of both Exxon Mobil and CAFA, federal
jurisdiction over diversity class actions is now at unprecedented levels.
C. CAFA Makes Significant Changes
Prior to 2005, federal courts applied the amount-in-controversy and the
diversity requirements to class actions in the same manner they applied
these requirements to all other diversity actions. Courts required that each
named plaintiff and each named defendant be diverse and that every
individual plaintiff satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. Now,
Exxon Mobil and CAFA have significantly changed the federal class action
terrain. In 2005, Congress passed CAFA, which expanded federal court
jurisdiction over class actions. Congress's goal with CAFA was "[t]o
amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions
to assure fairer outcomes for class members and defendants." 76 To
accomplish this objective, CAFA amended the federal diversity jurisdiction
statutes with respect to class actions. 7 7 CAFA made two important
alterations: one to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and
the other to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This section first
that CAFA makes, and then outlines
enumerates the jurisdictional changes 78
the exceptions to CAFA's jurisdiction.
1. Jurisdictional Amendments to Section 1332: Minimal Diversity
CAFA first amended the diversity jurisdiction statute. 79 Section four of
CAFA created a new subsection, (d)(2), of § 1332.80 Section 1332(d)(2)
gives the federal "district courts ... original jurisdiction over any civil
action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000... and is a class action in which... (A) any member of a class
of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant."'8 1 Section
1332(d)(2) thus establishes minimal diversity as the jurisdictional basis for
interstate class actions. Under the current version of § 1332, as long as any

75. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., the Court states that CAFA has no
bearing on its interpretation of § 1367. Id. at 2627-28. The Court suggested that CAFA does
not render its expansive interpretation of § 1367 moot. Id. at 2628. The Court seemed to
suggest that there are class actions that will fall outside the realm of CAFA and yet federal
jurisdiction may be proper under § 1367. Id. But class actions where a named plaintiff is
suing for more than $75,000, other plaintiffs for less than that amount, and the aggregate is
less than $5,000,000 (the cumulative amount in controversy that CAFA requires) will rarely
arise.
76. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (to be codified in scattered sections of 28

U.S.C.).
77. Id. §§ 4, 5, 119 Stat. at 9-13 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1453).
78. Although CAFA includes several other provisions, this Note is primarily concerned
with CAFA's effects on diversity jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction.
79. See CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. at 9-13 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1332).
80. Id. § 4, 119 Stat. at 9 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)).
81. Id., 119 Stat. at 9 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)).

1076

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

one plaintiff is diverse from any one defendant, federal courts will have the
authority to adjudicate that class action.
This is a major change from the pre-CAFA period. Ben-Hur required
82
complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants.
CAFA now applies to all proposed members of the class of plaintiffs, 83
rather than solely the named members. 84 A defendant can now establish
minimal diversity based on the entire potential plaintiffs' class rather than
the named, post-certification representative class members.
This change greatly expands federal diversity jurisdiction over class
actions. Congress intended CAFA to "strongly favor the exercise of federal
diversity jurisdiction over class actions with interstate ramifications" and
stated that it should be liberally applied to any suit that "resemble[s] a
purported class action." 85 When coupled with the modifications that CAFA
makes to the removal provisions of Title 28, CAFA dramatically changes
the federal class action jurisdiction setting.
2. Section 1453: Removal of Class Actions
Before CAFA, § 1441 prohibited defendants from removing diversity
actions to federal court if the plaintiff brought the action in the defendants'
home state. 8 6 CAFA adds a new section to Title 28, § 1453, which governs
the removal of class actions. 87 Section 1453 now allows defendants to
remove class actions to federal court "in accordance with section 1446...
without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which
the action is brought. ''88 Additionally, any defendant may remove the
action, with or without the consent of the other defendants. 89 Thus, § 1453
empowers any defendant to remove a minimally diverse class action to
federal court, and, as a result, greatly expands federal diversity jurisdiction
90
over class actions.
3. Federal Jurisdiction over "Mass Actions" Under 1332(d)(1 1)
In addition to expanding federal jurisdiction over actual or potential class
actions, CAFA further amended § 1332 by adding § 1332(d)(1 1). Section

82. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921); see also supra

Part I.B.2 and accompanying text.
83. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. at 9 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
84. Id. § 4, 119 Stat. at 11 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7)); see also S. Rep.
No. 109-14, at 44 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 42.
85. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 34.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(b) (2000).
87. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. at 12 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453).
88. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453 (West 2005).

89. Id.
90. See id. §§ 1441, 1453; David F. Herr & Michael C. McCarthy, The Class Action
FairnessAct of 2005-Congress Again Wades Into Complex Litigation Management Issues,
228 F.R.D. 673, 677-78 (2005).
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1332(d)(1 1) grants federal courts jurisdiction over "mass actionfs]," 9 1
which are defined as "any civil action ...in which monetary relief claims
of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that
the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact."' 92 In
passing § 1332(d)(11), Congress intended to prevent plaintiffs from
avoiding federal jurisdiction by choosing not93
to proceed as a class but rather
as a group of plaintiffs joined under Rule 20.
Mass actions differ from class actions in one important respect. In mass
actions, the plaintiffs' individual claims must satisfy one of the amount-incontroversy requirements of § 1332(a). 94 Congress intended that either
each individual claim in a mass action satisfy the $75,000 amount-incontroversy requirement of § 1332(a) or that the aggregate of all individual
claims exceed $5,000,000. 95 The statute further directs federal courts to
remand jurisdictionally insufficient claims to state court, but the federal
court will still exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
After CAFA, any case with over one hundred plaintiffs that either
independently or cumulatively satisfy one of § 1332's two amount-incontroversy requirements may now be heard in federal court. 96 Section
1332(d)(1 1), therefore, is Congress's way of getting at those controversies
that have the potential to become class actions, but where the plaintiffs have
chosen not to use the class action device. This is a significant change
because § 1332(d)(1 1) essentially requires courts to treat the joinder of one
hundred or more plaintiffs as a class action.
4. Possible State Jurisdiction Carve-Out: The "State Action" Exception
Under 1332(d)(4)
Congress recognized that CAFA greatly expanded federal jurisdiction
over interstate class actions. Consequently, Congress included several
carve-outs that restrict federal jurisdiction over cases that have the greatest
local impact. The first of these carve-outs is the "State Action" exception.
If the plaintiffs can satisfy the State Action exception's three
97
requirements, the federal court must remand the class action to state court.
These requirements are intended to ensure that if a controversy is truly local
in nature, state courts will still retain the authority to adjudicate it.
The State Action exception first requires federal courts to find that
"greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in
the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed." 9 8 Next, the court must determine that the defendant who resides in
91.
92.
93.
94.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(1 1).
Id. § 1332d(l1)(B)(i).
See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 46 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43-44.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i).

95. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 46-47, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 43-45.

96. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.
97. Id.
98. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I). The statute further requires that

1078

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

that state is a "primary focus" and "real target" of the litigation. 99 Finally,
in an attempt to deter multiple duplicative lawsuits in different states, the
exception requires courts to find that no identical or similar class actions
based on the harm in question have been filed in other states. To determine
whether other state court class actions are similar, the statute directs federal
courts to inquire "whether similar factual allegations have been made
against the defendant." 100 If a class action does satisfy the aforementioned
requirements, the federal court "shall decline to exercise jurisdiction" over
the case and must remand it to state court. 10 1
Congress reasoned that if over two-thirds of the class members are from
the same state as the primary defendant, state interests weigh heavily in
favor of adjudicating that case. Congress intended that all or almost all of
the damage that resulted from the alleged actions of the defendants be
in order for the state court to adjudicate the
suffered in the forum10 state
2
interstate class action.
The scope of the State Action exception is unknown at this time.
However, its impact is likely to be limited because § 1332(d)(4)'s
requirements are stringent, and courts are likely to interpret this section
narrowly. Congress intended to limit this exception to class actions brought
by citizens of one state against an in-state actor who is the primary
proponent of harm. 103 In that case, however, the federal courts lack

[(A)(i)](II) at least one defendant is a defendant(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff
class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed;
and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related
conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was
originally filed; and
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other
class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against
any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons; or
(B) two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).
99. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 40, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 38.
100. See id. at 41, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39.
101. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4).
102. See id.
103. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 41-42, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39-40. The
examples that Congress chose to include are indicative of the kinds of cases they intended
the state action exception to reach. A hypothetical state product liability class action against
an out-of-state automobile manufacturer and in-state automobile dealers brought solely on
behalf of and by Florida citizens is precisely the kind of case that, before CAFA, would have
been heard in state court because of the complete diversity rule. Id. at 41, reprintedin 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39. Thus, one can infer that this is the kind of case that Congress intended
that CAFA reach and shift into federal court.
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discretion to entertain jurisdiction over the class action and must remand it
to state court.
5. The Catchall Exception: § 1332(d)(3)
In contrast to the State Action exception, which prohibits federal courts
from exercising discretion in certain instances, the catchall exception grants
federal courts the discretion to decide whether to adjudicate CAFA class
actions. The catchall exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), provides that
Fa] district court may. in the interests of justice and lookini at the
totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction...
over a class action in which zreater than one-third but less than
two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes.., and
are citizens of the State in which the action
the primary defendants
04
was originally filed.'1
The next step in the catchall exception inquiry requires courts to apply a
balancing test and weigh several factors in order to determine whether the
forum state's interests are sufficiently compelling for that state to assert
jurisdiction over the class action. 10 5 The factors are designed to ensure that
if a class action that is truly local in nature is brought against a defendant in
her home state, it may be heard by that state's court. 106 Congress's
rationale for including this exception closely tracks its reasoning for
including the State Action exception. If a controversy is truly local in
nature and the forum state's interests weigh heavily in favor of adjudicating
the case, Congress felt that the state court should adjudicate it, and granted
the federal court the discretion to cede jurisdiction over that class action to
state court.107
104. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3).
105. Id. The factors include the following:

(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which
the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid
Federal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the
class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially
larger than the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the
other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of
States; and
(F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1
or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the
same or other persons have been filed.
Id.
106. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 36-38, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 35-37.
Congress intended this to be a narrow exception, as well as one "that was carefully drafted to
ensure that it does not become a jurisdictional loophole." Id. at 39, reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 38.
107. See id. at 39, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 38.

1080

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

D. The Landscape of FederalClass Actions After CAFA: Some Examples
CAFA greatly expanded federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions.
Under CAFA, three different interstate class action situations can arise that
differ depending on the percentage of class members who are citizens of the
same state as the primary defendants. The first scenario is a class action
where more than two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the same
state as the primary defendants. In this case, the federal district court
10 8
cannot hear the case and "shall" remand it to state court.
The second scenario is where more than one-third but less than twothirds of proposed class members are citizens of the same state as the
primary defendants. In this situation, the courts may decline to hear the
case and have the discretion to remand it to state court in the "interests of
09
justice."'
The third scenario is where less than one-third of the class members are
citizens of the same state as the primary defendant. In this event, the
federal court lacks discretion and must adjudicate the class action. To be
clear, CAFA does not explicitly require federal courts to exercise
.Jurisdiction over any class action. It is possible that the plaintiffs will file
suit in state court and the defendants will choose not to remove the case to
federal court. In that instance, the state court may adjudicate the class
action. However, this outcome is highly unlikely because defendants
10
perceive federal court to be friendlier to them.
Additionally, an individual plaintiff can still bring an action on her own
behalf. Assuming there is no other federal jurisdictional hook, a state court
will be the only forum available to adjudicate the case. This is unlikely,
however, because most plaintiffs will be unwilling to bring an individual
1
action to recover a small amount of damages. '
Most likely, in the above situation, the plaintiffs will file as a class in
state court, and the defendants will remove the class action to federal
district court under § 1453 because they perceive the federal court to be
friendlier to them. In this instance, the district court cannot decline to hear
the case, and federal jurisdiction over these class actions is, in effect,
exclusive. 112 This creates a situation similar to the exclusive jurisdiction

108. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 10 (2005) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(4)).
109. Id. § 4, 119 Stat. at 9-10 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)).
110. Allan Kanner, Interpretingthe Class Action FairnessAct in a Truly FairManner, 80
Tul. L. Rev. 1645, 1666-67 (2006) ("The reason fewer class actions are tried in federal
courts is due more to hostility of the class action mechanism by federal courts, which has
'resulted in ...increasing denial[s] of class action certification."') (quoting M. Jared Marsh,
Comment, The Class Action Lack of Fairness Act of 2002: Congress Attempts to Federalize
Class Action Lawsuits, 71 UMKC L. Rev. 151, 151 (2002)).
111. For example, plaintiffs will be unwilling to bring individual claims on their own
behalf to recover $3.90. See Kay, supra note 15.

112. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (establishing the statutory baseline of federal
jurisdiction over this type of class action).
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provisions of the aforementioned hypothetical class action statute. 11 3
Consequently, CAFA causes federal courts to contravene the Erie doctrine.
E. Diversity Class Actions and the Erie Doctrine
Because CAFA class actions are based on diversity jurisdiction, every
CAFA class action will be subject to the strictures of the Erie doctrine.
Prior to Erie, under the holding of Swift v. Tyson, 1 14 federal courts applied
their version of what they thought the proper substantive law should be
when sitting in diversity and ignored state common law. 115 Federal courts
created a "general commercial law" that oftentimes
differed from the
1 16
common law of the state in which the court sat.
This led to "vertical forum shopping." 1 7 Plaintiffs attempted to get into
federal court or stay out of federal court because the outcome of their case
could be different under the federal or state common law. 118 As Justice
Louis Brandeis explained, "[Swift] made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the
state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which
119
the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen."
Under Swift, the litigants' vertical choice of forum
between state and federal
20
court affected the outcome of the litigation.1
The Erie Court was concerned with the practice of vertical forum
shopping.' 2 1 Consequently, in Erie, the Court overruled Swift. The Erie
Court held that federal courts have no power to create or develop
"substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be
113. See Sherman, supra note 16, at 1608 ("After CAFA, the federal courts are essentially
'the only game in town' for multistate and national class actions.").
114. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (finding that the federal courts had the power to discern a
generally applicable federal common law).
115. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
116. Id. at75.
117. See id. at 76-77 (describing what is currently known as vertical forum shopping).
118. See id. The Court stated,
[Tihe discrimination resulted from the wide range of persons held entitled to avail
themselves of the federal rule by resort to the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Through this jurisdiction individual citizens willing to remove from their own
State and become citizens of another might avail themselves of the federal rule.
And, without even change of residence, a corporate citizen of the State could avail
itself of the federal rule by re-incorporating under the laws of another State ....
Id. For a much maligned example of vertical forum shopping, see Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). In this case, a
Kentucky company reincorporated in Tennessee in order to create diversity of citizenship
and get its case into federal court, where the substantive law was much more favorable to its
position. Id. at 523-24. Ironically, the same concern presents itself with CAFA: Plaintiffs
will seek to construct their complaint so that they avoid federal court. See Andrre Sophia
Blumstein, A New Road to Resolution: The ClassAction FairnessAct of 2005, 41 Tenn. B.J.
16, 23 (2005) ("It is not difficult to imagine various ways in which resourceful class counsel
may manage to keep their state law class actions in state court ... .
119. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
120. Id. at 76-77.
121. Id. at 75-76.

1082

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 75

local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the
law of torts."1 22 Accordingly, the Erie doctrine requires federal courts
sitting in diversity to apply state substantive law. 123 Because the main
purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent state courts from
mistreating out-of-state litigants, 124 federal courts sitting in diversity had no
authority to change any state substantive right or rule of decision. 125 When
sitting in diversity, the federal court system's only function was to apply
26
state laws fairly.1
The Court further held that Congress also cannot establish substantive
rules of decision with respect to these matters.t 27 Neither the courts nor
Congress can create rules of law unless they are authorized by a section of
the Constitution. 128 When the federal courts, sitting in diversity, created
general federal common law, they were acting unconstitutionally because
they had no express constitutional authority to create substantive common
law. 129 Except for the federal Constitution and federal statutes, "the law to
130
be applied in any case is the law of the State."'
The Erie Court also held that state decisional common law and state
statutory law are both included among the "laws of the several states"
mentioned in the RDA. 13 1 The RDA requires U.S. courts to apply "[t]he
laws of the several states ... as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 132 Federal courts
were violating the RDA by creating and applying general federal common
133
law in areas where the state was authorized to exercise its authority.
Thus, the Erie doctrine requires federal courts hearing interstate class
actions founded on the diversity statute' 34 to apply the substantive law of
the state in which the federal court sits. Because CAFA extends federal
jurisdiction to minimally diverse interstate class actions, a large number of
13 5
class actions will in effect be heard exclusively in federal court.
Defendants will always want to remove class actions to federal court

122. Id. at 78.
123. Id. ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.... There is no federal general
common law.").
124. Id. at 74.
125. Id.

126. 19 Wright et al., supra note 1, § 4506.
127. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state .... ").
128. See 19 Wright, et al., supra note 1, § 4505.
129. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
130. Id.

131. See id. at 79. The Court went out of its way to note that it was not holding § 34 of
the Judiciary Act (the diversity statute's antecedent) unconstitutional. Id. at 79-80.
132. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
133. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
134. See CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9-13 (2005) (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332).
135. See supraPart II.B.2 and accompanying text.
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because it is perceived to be more defendant-friendly. 136 The federal
courts, in turn, are bound by Erie to apply the state substantive law that
governs the action. 137 Yet, state courts will not have an opportunity to
create common law in those areas where federal courts will exercise
exclusive jurisdiction.
Vertical forum shopping, the Erie doctrine, and principles of federalism
and democracy all ignited the Congressional debate over CAFA. CAFA's
proponents were concerned about state judicial abuses that encouraged
plaintiffs to choose state court over federal court. 138 They also argued that
state courts improperly applied their own laws outside of the geographical
boundaries of their home state. 139 CAFA's opponents were concerned
about the Erie doctrine implications of extending practically exclusive
federal jurisdiction over state-law-based class actions. Other critics argued
that with CAFA, Congress passed a procedural statute that, in practice,
affects substantive tort reform.1 40 These critics assert that this conduct
conflicts with core principles of democratic theory. 14 1 The next section
explores Congress's rationale for CAFA and opponents' critiques of CAFA
in detail.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER CAFA: STATE JUDICIARY ABUSES, FALSE
FEDERALISM, AND ERIE

A. CongressionalConcerns with the Pre-CAFA Class Action Landscape
1. Forum Shopping Concerns: Jurisdictional Manipulation
The Senate issued extensive findings outlining their reasons for passing
CAFA. 142 The theme supporting all of their arguments was the notion that
the plaintiffs' bar manipulated the complete diversity doctrine in order to
avoid federal jurisdiction in diversity class actions. 14 3 The Senate
contended that the plaintiffs' bar added named plaintiffs in order to destroy
complete diversity and force class actions into state court, which the
plaintiffs' bar perceived to be more plaintiff-friendly. 144 The Senate
reasoned that this "vertical forum shopping" was undesirable because states

136.
137.
138.
139.

Seeid.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 61 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 56-57.
See id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 56-57.

140. See infra Part II.B. 1 and accompanying text.
141. See id.
142. See generally S. Rep. No. 109-14, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
143. See id. at 10, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11 ("In interstate class actions,
plaintiffs' counsel frequently and purposely evade federal jurisdiction by adding named
plaintiffs or defendants simply based on their state of citizenship in order to defeat complete
diversity.").
144. See id. at 10, 13, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11, 13-14.
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were unable to adjudicate national class actions fairly. 14 5 Consequently, the
Senate argued that the only way to solve this problem was by expanding
federal jurisdiction over class actions because federal courts could
46
adjudicate them fairly, without a pro-plaintiff bias. 1
2. Magnet Courts: State Class Action Certification Practice Encourages
Forum Shopping
Another related problem that prompted Congress to pass CAFA was the
concern over "magnet" state courts. Magnet state courts were state courts
that were applying more lenient standards for certifying classes than the
federal system. 14 7
The Senate dubbed those courts' approach to
certification the "I never met a class action I didn't like" method of
certification. 14 8 Because those states had more lenient certification
standards, plaintiffs were more likely to file class actions in state court in
149
those states.
The Senate then tried to ascertain why there were differences between
state and federal court certification standards in those magnet state courts.
They found that the state rules that outlined class action certification
standards were substantially similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
in most jurisdictions.' 50 State judges were simply applying Rule 23
differently than federal judges. 15 1 This resulted in state judges improperly
certifying nationwide classes. 152 One example that the Senate offered in its
findings was Madison County, Illinois. In the state court located in
Madison County, the number of class actions filed grew from two in 1998
to thirty-nine in 2000.153 Many of those class actions had no real relation to
Madison County itself-they were nationwide in character. The plaintiffs
filed in Madison County because they perceived it to be favorable to
certification.
This led some advocates to dub Madison a "judicial
54
hellhole."1

145. See id. at 5, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
146. Id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.

147. Id. at 22, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22.
148. Id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22 (quoting The ClassAction FairnessAct of
1999: Hearings on S. 353 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (prepared statement of Stephen
Morrison), available at 1999 WL 273272.
149. See id. at 23, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 23 ("Copy cat class actions clog the
courts and permit forum shopping.").
150. Id. at 13, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14.
151. Id. at 13-14, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14 (noting that thirty-six states have
adopted a class action certification rule modeled on Federal Rule 23); see also 735 I11.
Comp. Stat. 5/2-801 (1993). The Illinois state rule on class certification tracks Rule 23's
requirements nearly identically.
152. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 13, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 13-14.
153. See id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14.
154. American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hellholes 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf [hereinafter "Hellhole Study"].
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3. Judicial Hellholes
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) conducted a study in
2004 where they determined the jurisdictions most favorable to class action
certification. 155 The "Hellhole Study" demonstrates Congress's main
concern with state adjudication of interstate class actions. The ATRA
named Madison County, Illinois, the top judicial hellhole in 2004.156 It
found that "'travel agent' trial lawyers ... shop[ped] for the best forum to
have their cases heard, regardless of whether the case ha[d] any logical
connection to the local community."' 157 Because Madison County had
overly broad venue rules, the ATRA argued that the county attracted these
predatory plaintiffs' lawyers. 158 This led the ATRA to dub Madison
County a "Class Action Paradise" 159 and the ATRA offered several
examples where Madison
County courts adjudicated interstate class actions
60
with national effects.1
The ATRA contended that "local judges. . . 'frequently decided to hear
cases that other [federal] courts have refused to hear," ' 16 and also that
judges in Madison and other judicial hellholes improperly "certiflied]
162
classes that do not have a sufficient commonality of facts or law."'
Congress sided with the ATRA and considered state judicial laxity towards
certifying interstate classes, typified by the Hellhole Study, a significant
problem. It argued that this practice encouraged vertical forum shopping,
63
one of the main concerns of the Erie Court. 1
There are two types of forum shopping, horizontal and vertical. Because
the laws among the fifty states diverge, horizontal forum shopping occurs
when litigants pick one state over another because the chosen state has more

155. See generally id.

156. Id. at 14.
157. Id.
158. See id. ("[Madison's venue rules] allow claims to proceed.., where the plaintiff and
defendant are located out-of-state, the plaintiff's exposure occurred outside the state, medical
treatment was provided outside the state, no witnesses live in Illinois, and no evidence
relates to the state.").

159. Id. The study notes that the number of class actions filed in Madison County has
grown substantially each year, ranging from two in 1998 to one hundred and six in 2003. Id.
at 15.
160. See id. at 15-16. Examples given include a products liability case brought against
Ford, a fraudulent advertising claim against Intel, a products liability case brought against
Sears Roebuck, and a case against American Express for overcharging customers. See id. at
15. It should be noted that all of these cases involve national or multinational corporations
and nationally known and sold products and therefore ostensibly are interstate in nature.
161. Id. at 15 (quoting Amity Shales, Commentary, Big Judgments, Bigger Mistakes;
Legal Windfalls in Madison County Demonstrate the Need to Limit Forum Shopping of

Class-Action Lawsuits, Chi. Trib., June 29, 2004, at 15).
162. Id. at 9; see also S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 22 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3, 22.
163. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1938).
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favorable laws. 164 Vertical forum shopping was the main concern of the
Erie Court. It occurs when federal courts sitting in diversity apply different
substantive law than state courts. 165 The difference in outcome between
state and federal court causes litigants to attempt to establish or defeat
federal jurisdiction, based on the favorability of the outcome in federal
court.

166

The Senate was especially concerned about this problem and devoted an
entire section in their findings to it. 167 The ATRA echoed this sentiment by
enumerating several interstate class actions brought in Madison County, all
68
of which were brought by the same plaintiffs' law firm.1
The Senate was concerned about plaintiffs shopping between state court
and federal court because, in states like Illinois, there was a greater
probability that a Madison County state court would certify a nationwide
class than an Illinois federal court. 16 9 This encouraged litigants to avoid
federal court by drafting their pleadings creatively in order to destroy
federal jurisdiction. Consequently, plaintiffs' lawyers attempted to select
70
the forum that was most favorable to class action litigation.1
The ATRA argued that in order to dissuade opportunistic plaintiffs'
lawyers from vertical forum shopping, Congress should "[p]reserve[] the
[a]uthority of [flederal [c]ourts to [h]ear [interstate class actions].' 7 1 In
order to do this, they advocated that Congress shift all interstate class
actions to federal court.172
But, the ATRA's solution does not address horizontal forum shopping
concerns. The differences in state substantive law will still encourage
horizontal forum shopping, as plaintiffs have the incentive to file lawsuits
in states with the most favorable substantive law.173 Furthermore, Erie did
not abrogate the state courts' right to apply a different class action
certification standard than the federal standard. Neither did Erie restrain the
state courts' ability to adjudicate state law claims. Erie, in fact, preserved
the sovereignty of state law. 174 Federal courts sitting in diversity must still

164. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965) (noting that one of the "twin
aims" of the Erie doctrine was to discourage forum shopping between federal and state
court).

165. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-77.
166. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68.
167. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 22, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22 ("Some magnet
state courts easily certify national class actions.").
168. See Hellhole Study, supra note 154, at 15; supra note 160 and accompanying text.
169. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 22, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22.
170. See id. at 13-14, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 13-14.

171. Hellhole Study, supranote 154, at 43.
172. See id.

173. Cf Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment inpersonam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1940))).
174. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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apply state substantive law. Congress must pass a statute in order to change
the substantive rules of decision in federal court. CAFA, however, does not
alter state substantive law, or attempt to acknowledge the horizontal forum
75
shopping problem. 1
4. False Federalism
a. CongressionalConcerns About Improper State Influence over Other
States
The Senate was also concerned that state courts, by adjudicating
nationwide class actions, were exercising too much authority over out-ofstate citizens.1 76 The Senate argued that it was improper for one state to
apply its laws nationally. 177 Consequently, the Senate contended that class
actions with nationwide impact should be heard in federal court. As the
Senate argued in its findings, "[w]hy should an Alabama state court tell 20
million people in all 50 states what kind of airbags they can have in their
cars?"' 78 The Senate reasoned that state courts do not have the power to
influence behavior outside their own state. The Senate dubbed this practice
"false federalism." 179 Traditional principles of federalism, the Senate
argued, require that state courts' power be restricted to within their own
borders. 180 Only the federal court system should make national decisions
that affect citizens of other states.
The Senate further insisted that it is the province of the federal
government to step in and enforce the boundaries between the states so that
one state does not usurp the legal system of another. 18 1 For example,
consider a state law products liability case. 182 Because manufacturers have
no practical way of keeping their products out of any particular state,
plaintiffs can choose among several states and select the jurisdiction in

175. For a discussion of the changes that CAFA makes, see supra Part I.C.
176. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 23-24 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24-25.

177. Id. at 24, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24.
178. Id., reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24.

179. Id. at 26, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 26. For an introduction of the principle
of false federalism and an explanation of how it relates to class action litigation, see The
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Workplace Goods Job Growth and
Competitiveness Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1875 Before H. Comm. of the Judiciary,

106th Cong. 119 (1999) (statement of Walter Dellinger, Solicitor General), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/j udiciary/hju62443.000/hju62443-0.HTM
("[A]
state of course does not have any cognizable, federalism-based interest in interpreting,
applying, and thereby dictating the substantive law of other states.").
180. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 24, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24.
181. See id. at 23-24, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24. The Senate was concerned
with enforcing the limits of state sovereignty. This is a situation where the Senate felt it was
the federal government's responsibility to step in and restrict the influence that one state can
exert over another via adjudication of nationwide class actions in state courts. See id. at 26,
reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 26.
182. See Michael S. Greve, Federalism'sFrontier,7 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 93, 100 (2002).
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which the laws are most favorable to their claim. 183 This is a concern
because when states impose their laws on the country at large, 184 state
courts shift money and resources from out-of-state corporations to in-state
plaintiffs. 18 5 As a result, state courts undermine one of the core principles
of federalism: ' States are independent
entities that should exercise
186
sovereignty only over their own territory.
b. Avery v. State Farm andIts Ilk
In support of their contention that state courts were improperly applying
state laws to out-of-state citizens, Congress furnished the specific example
of Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 187 a widely
publicized case that illustrates some of the dangers of allowing state courts
to adjudicate interstate class actions.
In Avery, a nationwide class of plaintiffs sued State Farm, a national
1 88
insurance company, under Illinois consumer protection and contract law.
However, several other states' laws directly contradicted Illinois' laws and
expressly permitted State Farm to perform the activity that the plaintiffs
89
alleged caused them harm. 1
Illinois' substantive law created a cause of action for the nationwide class
of plaintiffs, but the Avery class itself failed to meet several of Rule 23's
requirements for certification. Most importantly, the plaintiffs could not
show that there were "questions of fact or law common to the class"
90
because contradictory state laws would apply to the nationwide class.'

183. See id.

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 99; see generally S. Rep. No. 109-14 reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.

However, if a corporation is purposefully availing itself of business within a jurisdiction,
then it is foreseeable that it will be subject to that jurisdiction's regulation and possibly haled
into court and subject to its laws. This seems more like a due process problem than a
federalism problem. For an elaboration of this concept, see infra Part II.B.4.
187. 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1254, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (affirming the certification of a

nationwide plaintiff class with respect to an action against State Farm for breach of contract
claims), affid in part, rev'd in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005) (holding that it was an abuse

of discretion for the trial court to certify the class of nationwide plaintiffs seeking restitution
for breach of contract claims because that group lacked commonality of claims).
188. See generally Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L- 114, 1999 WL
1022134 (111. Cir., Oct. 8, 1999).
189. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 24-25, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24-25. The

controversy was over the use of non-original manufacturer equipment for parts in repairs, a
practice that Illinois state law determined would be a breach of State Farm's contractual
obligation under their insurance policy agreements with policyholders. Id. at 24, reprintedin
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24-25. Two states, however, Massachusetts and Hawaii, expressly
embraced this practice. Id. at 25, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 25.
190. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-801(2) (1998); Cf Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 819 (noting that
the Illinois statute is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and therefore federal
interpretations of Rule 23 are "persuasive authority"). Note that Illinois' highest court did
eventually overturn the certification decision, so the state did make the correct certification
decision, albeit belatedly. Id.
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Nevertheless, the state trial court certified the nationwide class and allowed
the class action to proceed. 191
Congress considered Avery symptomatic of the larger problem of state
courts improperly certifying nationwide classes 192 and applying state laws
to out-of-state citizens. State courts, like the trial court in Avery,
improperly certified classes in situations where many states' laws could
potentially apply to the class. 193 In those cases, it is clear that the plaintiffs'
classes did not satisfy the commonality-of-law requirement of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23. However, state judges were applying Rule 23
differently than federal judges. The Senate found that these state judges
were applying Rule 23's certification requirements improperly, and as a
194
consequence, they were incorrectly certifying nationwide classes.
Congress argued that the only solution to this problem was to shift interstate
class actions into federal court, where federal judges would correctly apply
the class certification standards of Rule 23.195
B. Problems that CAFA Has Created
CAFA's critics claim that the Senate and ATRA overestimated the
gravity of the problem of state courts adjudicating interstate class actions.
This section explores these ciiics' argumefits. Part :II.B.1 describes
CAFA's relationship with the theory of "Procedural Swift," where the
government enacts substantive legislation under a procedural guise. Part
II.B.2 outlines CAFA's effect on the constitutional holding of Erie. Part
II.B.3 discusses CAFA's effects on the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules
Enabling Act. Part II.B.4 illustrates the view that the Senate vastly
overstated its concerns over "False Federalism."
1. Procedural Swift: Substantive Legislation Through Procedural Rules
CAFA is a jurisdictional statute that Congress passed in order to change
the substantive outcomes of interstate class actions. 19 6 Professor JoEllen
Lind has dubbed this phenomenon "Procedural Swift."'1 97 Procedural Swift
occurs when "the national government intentionally uses its power to
displace substantive law historically reserved to the states, but

191. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 24-25, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24-25.
192. See id. at 14, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14 (chiding state judges for their
"lax" attitude towards applying class certification requirements).
193. See id. at 25-26, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 25-26 (mentioning several
situations where state courts certified class actions notwithstanding the implication and
potential application of the laws of numerous other states).
194. Cf id. at 25, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 25.
195. See id. at 14, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14-15.

196. Id. at 22, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22-23 (illustrating examples of national
classes that state court judges certified while federal judges did not).
197. See JoEllen Lind, "ProceduralSwift ": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law,

and Democratic Values, 37 Akron L. Rev. 717, 719 (2004).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

1090

[Vol. 75

indirectly."' 98 Lind argues that the federal government sometimes attempts
to reform state tort laws by creating federal procedural rules that present
greater hurdles for plaintiffs to recover under state law. If federal
procedural rules displace state substantive law in federal courts, it
encourages vertical forum shopping.199 Litigants will attempt to draft their
complaint in order to gain entry into whichever court they perceive to be
200
more favorable to their case.
Lind contends that Procedural Swift is harmful because it erodes many
core democratic principles, such as transparency in the lawmaking process,
political participation, and accountability. 20 1
Because "procedural
principles are technical and arcane, by their nature they limit the
information to people to make good decisions about the policy issues that
are at stake." 20 2 Procedural changes are difficult for citizens to understand,
and therefore it is difficult for citizens to predict their likely effects. 20 3 As a
result, procedural legislation is opaque lawmaking that has anti-democratic
consequences. 20 4 The people cannot hold their representatives accountable
for passing a statute if the electorate is not cognizant of that statute's
2 05
effects.
Procedural Swift also conflicts with traditional notions of federalism. In
our federalist system, the states are the primary venues where citizens can
participate in the governmental process. 2 06 The states are also the guardians
of individual rights and liberties. 20 7 Lind maintains that because average
citizens are far removed from the operation of the federal government,
Procedural Swift removes the people's ability to participate in the state
governmental process. 20 8 Consequently, Procedural Swift usurps citizens'
power to self-regulate their everyday relations because "procedural
maneuvering at the national level takes place one step removed from the
'209
political process of state lawmaking.
Lind argues that with CAFA, Congress engaged in Procedural Swift by
enlarging the scope of diversity jurisdiction over interstate class actions. 2 10
She asserts that "[i]t is not hard to see that the purpose of the legislation is
to employ another procedural tool-manipulation of diversity jurisdiction-

198. Id. at 718-19.
199. See id. at 717 ("[P]rocedural differences in the federal courts typically disadvantage
plaintiffs, not defendants, and so provide an increasing incentive for defendant forum
shopping.").
200. See id.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 721-22.
Id.
Id. at 717.
See id. at 722.
Seeid. at 718-19.
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to produce a different substantive outcome. '2 11 Accordingly, with CAFA,
Congress stealthily utilized Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to enact
national substantive tort reform.
Rule 23 by itself most likely "really regulates procedure" 2 12 and does
"not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. '2 13 It thus would
pass the Rules Enabling Act test that the Court outlined in Hanna v.
Plumer.2 14 However, as Rule 23 is applied to interstate class actions, it
limits plaintiffs' right to have their cases adjudicated. Congress did not
choose to directly enact a substantive tort reform statute based on the
authority granted by the Commerce Clause. 2 15 Instead, as Lind asserts,
Congress chose to change the substantive outcome of class actions by using
a federal procedural device.
Lind posits that by legislating substantively with a procedural device,
Congress sidestepped democratic responsibility
in passing CAFA. 2 16 This,
2 17
Lind contends, is backdoor tort reform.
2. CAFA Causes Federal Courts to Create Substantive Common Law
Other critics argue that CAFA contravenes the Erie doctrine. Those
critics are concerned with the federal court system's lack of constitutional
authority to create law.2 18 In practice, CAFA enacts exclusive federal
jurisdiction over some interstate class actions. 2 19 If any potential class
members are citizens of the same state as any defendant, the federal court
has original jurisdiction over that class action. 220 Because those class
actions are based on diversity jurisdiction, Erie requires the federal court to
apply the state substantive law that governs the plaintiffs' underlying
22 1
claim.
However, under CAFA, state courts will most likely never hear these
cases. Although the plain language of CAFA does not technically extend
exclusive jurisdiction over interstate class actions to federal courts, the
effect of CAFA will be to force interstate class actions into federal court.

211. Id. at 756.
212. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
213. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
214. 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965); see also infra Part II.B.3.d.
215. For an argument that Congress could adopt substantive tort legislation governing
interstate class actions based on the Commerce Clause, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 909, 910
(1995).
216. See Lind, supra note 197, at 719.
217. See id.

218. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
219. See supra Introduction; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2)-(4) (West 2005))
(describing the scenarios in which the federal court has jurisdiction over interstate class
actions yet also has the discretion to remand class actions back to state court); Issacharoff &
Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1416-17.
220. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
221. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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Defendants will always remove class actions to federal court because they
perceive the federal courts to be more defendant-friendly than state
courts. 2 2 2
Furthermore, because minimal diversity is such a lenient
jurisdictional standard, it is likely that the federal courts will have original
jurisdiction over many class actions. 223 Additionally, because the economy
is now nationally integrated, the activities of one company regularly reach
consumers in more than one state.224
Because "many [CAFA] class actions ... like consumer class actions...
are not financially viable as individual cases," plaintiffs will be unlikely to
bring individual claims based on the underlying state law in state court.2 25
Hence, CAFA's practical effect will be to create a situation in which federal
courts exert exclusive jurisdiction 226 over some state-law based class
2 27
actions.
As a result of CAFA, the federal courts "will inappropriately usurp the
primary role of state courts in developing their own state tort and contract
laws, and will impair their ability to establish consistent interpretations of
those laws." 228 Because state courts will be restricted from hearing most or
all interstate class actions, they will never have a chance to create law in
those areas. "The likely effect of CAFA will then be to allow [federal
courts to create] a body of national law.., that corresponds to the demands
of an undifferentiated [national] market. '229 Federal courts will lack any
"relevant source of authority for how to handle similar problems" that arise
in the context of class actions. 230 Consequently, federal courts will, out of
necessity, develop a generalized federal commercial common law of class
23
actions. I
This is an unacceptable and unconstitutional practice in light of the
Court's holding in Erie. Under Erie, federal courts do not have the
232
constitutional authority to develop substantive federal common law.
CAFA therefore directs federal judges to act unconstitutionally by creating
a substantive federal common law of interstate class actions, which is
outside the scope of their constitutional power under Article 111.233

222. See Kanner, supra note 110, at 1666-67.
223. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1360 (noting that the national market is
becoming increasingly interconnected).
224. See id.

225. Id. at 1417.
226. For a general explanation of exclusive federal jurisdiction, see 13 Wright et al.,
supra note 1, § 3527.
227. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
228. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 92 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 84 (minority

views of Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Biden, Feingold, and Durbin).
229. Isacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1419.
230.
231.
232.
233.
Tul. L.

Id.
Id. at 1420.
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Cf Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the ClassAction FairnessAct, 80
Rev. 1723, 1767 (2006) (arguing that if federal courts were to develop independent
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3. The Practical Result of CAFA in Light of the Aims of Erie
a. CAFA May Be Outcome Determinative
Another major concern of the Erie Court was the risk of forum shopping.
The differences between the general federal commercial law that developed
after Swift v. Tyson 234 and state commercial law led litigants to select either
federal or state court based on the favorability of the chosen forum's
laws. 235 Consequently, the Erie Court held that federal courts sitting in
diversity should "apply state law fairly" so that the outcome between the
two forums was as similar as possible to discourage shopping between the
236
two court systems.
With CAFA, Congress intended to shift interstate class actions based on
state law into the federal court system because of the lesser probability that
federal courts would certify an interstate class action under the standards
outlined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.237 CAFA, therefore,
working in conjunction with Rule 23, may be outcome determinative and
may encourage vertical forum shopping in the same way the Court
disaffirmed in Erie.
23 8 It
Rule 23 defines class action certification standards in federal court.
requires federal judges to "find[] that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members." 239 However, Rule 23 is a procedural rule that applies
to only certification. Erie requires federal courts sitting in diversity to
apply state substantive law. 240 In a national class action, a federal court
may be obligated by Erie to apply fifty different states' laws to one class of
plaintiffs. One consequence of the lack of uniformity among state laws is
that the Erie doctrine makes it more difficult for a potential interstate
plaintiffs' class to satisfy Rule 23's commonality of law requirement in
interstate class actions. 2 4 1 If fifty different state laws apply to one national

choice-of-law rules for diversity cases, it "would undermine the basic constitutional holding
of Erie").
234. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
235. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
236. Id.
237. See James Pfander, The Substance and Procedure of Class Action Reform, 93 Ill.

B.J. 144, 144 (2005). For a discussion of federal certification standards, see supra Part I.A.
238. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

239. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
240. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
2005)
241. See generally Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (I11.
(reversing the certification of a nationwide class in Illinois because the class lacked common
questions of law based on the application of different state consumer protection and fraud
laws).
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class of plaintiffs, it is unlikely that the applicable law will be "common"
enough to merit certification under Rule 23.242
Thus, CAFA and Rule 23 encourage plaintiffs to avoid federal
jurisdiction. CAFA creates a great incentive for plaintiffs to tailor their
complaints in order to avoid the federal court system. Defendants, in turn,
will attempt to remove class actions from state court to get into the much
more defendant-friendly federal court system.
This seems like a return to the days of Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. 243 In that case, a

Tennessee corporation dissolved itself and reincorporated in Kentucky in
24 4
order to create diversity of citizenship and establish federal jurisdiction.
The corporation undertook these actions because the federal court would
apply federal common commercial law, which was much more favorable to
the defendants than Tennessee state law. 24 5

CAFA encourages similar

behavior on both sides; plaintiffs will want to get into state court, and
defendants will want to stay out of state court. But, because minimal
diversity is such a lenient standard, and because CAFA class actions will
most likely involve corporations where at least some of the alleged
misconduct was of an interstate nature, defense attorneys will have an easier

time crafting their complaints in order to establish minimal diversity and
246
gain access to the federal court system.

Moreover, the same problem that prompted Congress to enact CAFAhorizontal forum shopping--could arise in the federal court system.
Plaintiffs will continue to seek out "magnet" courts in districts and circuits

that are certification-friendly. 247 This will result in an increase in class
action filings in those magnet courts. 248
Consequently, CAFA, in

242. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995). In RhonePoulenc, the plaintiffs contracted HIV from infected blood. They sued the drug companies
who manufactured the blood solids from which they contracted the virus. Id. at 1294. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ordered decertification of the nationwide class
of plaintiffs. Id. at 1297. The court concluded that
the thousands of members of the plaintiff class . . . will have their duties
determined, under a law that is merely an amalgam, an averaging, of the
nonidentical negligence laws of 51 jurisdictions. No one doubts that Congress
could constitutionally prescribe a uniform standard of liability for
manufacturers ....

[But] [t]he point of Erie is that Article III of the Constitution

does not empower the federal courts to create such a regime for diversity cases.
Id. at 1302.
243. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
244. See id. at 523-24.
245. See generally id.
246. See Blumstein, supra note 118, at 23; Kay, supra note 15 (describing the kinds of
class action cases that will generally be heard in federal court after CAFA). One example of
these kinds of class actions involves The Home Depot, a national chain that has 1061 retail
locations nationwide. See Kay, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
247. Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, Possible Unintended Consequences of the
Class Action FairnessAct, Metro Corp. Couns. Apr. 5, 2005, at 5.
248. Id.
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conjunction with Rule 23, will encourage both vertical and horizontal forum
shopping.
b. CAFA and the Rules EnablingAct
The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to create rules of
procedure for cases in the federal district courts. 249 Such rules cannot
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. '250 The Supreme Court
issued Rule 23 pursuant to its authority under the REA. As Rule 23 now
interacts with CAFA, however, it is questionable whether Rule 23's
certification requirements abridge the substantive rights of a national class
of plaintiffs, because CAFA makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to get a
national class certified. 25 1 Accordingly, CAFA makes it more difficult for
plaintiffs to assert their substantive rights under state law.
Congress clearly intended to change the outcome of class actions by
placing them in a forum where they are less likely to be certified. Congress
used a procedural device--diversity jurisdiction-to affect the substantive
outcome of class actions. Congress recognized that federal judges
will be
2 52
less likely to certify interstate classes than some state judges.
Fourteen states have chosen not to base their class action certification
standards on Rule 23.253 In those states, CAFA makes a drastic change 2to
54
state certification requirements that may abridge some substantive rights.
Plaintiffs who would have been able to seek relief under state law prior to
CAFA now will be subject to different, more stringent class certification
5
requirements.

25

249. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000).
250. Id. § 2072(b).
251. See Daniel R. Karon, "How Do You Take Your Multi-State, Class Action Litigation?
One Lump or Two? "-InfusingState Class-Action Jurisprudence into Federal,Multi-State
Class Certification Analyses in a "CAFA-Nated" World, SL081 ALI-ABA 1503, 1513-14
(2006); see also 19 Wright et al., supra note 1, § 4509 ("It is also conceivable that unusual
cases occasionally might arise in which.., application of a Civil Rule (even to a matter it
clearly comprehends) would intrude upon state substantive rights or policies to a degree that
probably was not foreseen when the Rule was promulgated. In these rare cases, a federal
court might not be able to rely on the presumptive validity of the Civil Rule and instead
might have to determine independently whether, given the circumstances, the "substantive
rights" proviso bars application of the Rule in that particular case.").
252. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14 ("In contrast
[to state courts], federal courts generally scrutinize proposed settlements much more
carefully and pay closer attention to the procedural requirements for certifying a matter for
class treatment.").
253. Id. at 86, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 78.
254. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merch. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
Ragan concerned a diversity action in Kansas. Id. at 531. A Kansas state statute conflicted
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, concerning when the statute of limitations was
tolled. Id. The Court applied the state statute because the "cause of action is created by local
law[; thus] the measure of it is to be found only in local law.... Otherwise there is a
different measure of the cause of action in one court than in the other, and the principle of
Erie[] is transgressed." Id. at 533.
255. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 86, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 78.
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c. CAFA Does Not Alter Rule 23 to Violate the Rules Enabling Act
Even though CAFA alters the outcome of interstate class actions and
encourages forum shopping, it most likely does not violate the Rules
Enabling Act. Under the Rules Enabling Act test outlined by the Supreme
Court in Hanna v. Plumer,256 Rule 23 will most likely still be acceptable
after CAFA. Class action certification standards affect the process for
enforcing individual rights but not the substantive rights themselves
because plaintiffs can still bring individual actions based on the underlying
state substantive law. 257 Although CAFA does place a substantial obstacle
in the path of prospective state plaintiffs, Rule 23 still "really regulates
procedure," because it does not technically abridge their substantive rights
2 58
under state law.
However, the Hanna test also has a practical prong that analyzes whether
2 59
the questioned rule will be relevant to the litigants' choice of forum.
CAFA, in conjunction with Rule 23, will probably induce forum shopping
in instances where the state and federal certification standards for class
actions differ. Plaintiffs will try to remain in state court and defendants will
try to get into federal court in those cases because the federal certification
standard is likely to be stricter than the state standard. In those states, it is
more questionable whether Rule 23 "really regulates procedure" because
CAFA is intended to use Rule 23 to affect the substantive outcome of class
260
actions.
d. CAFA and the Rules ofDecision Act
CAFA may also conflict with the Rules of Decision Act. 26 1 The RDA
requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state common law as the
"rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States." 262 The
RDA problem is marked with respect to issues of first impression under
263
state law.

256. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
257. Id. at 464.
258. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
259. Id. at 468 ("The 'outcome-determination' test therefore cannot be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.").
260. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14); see also Karon, supra note 251, at
1513-14 (arguing that the choice-of-law inquiry in national class actions may be a
substantive question that requires federal judges to consider state class action certification
jurisprudence).
261. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
262. Id.; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
263. Kanner, supra note 110, at 1654 ("[CAFA] is particularly problematic when a case
involves a novel state law claim, such as those concerning consumer fraud. Federal courts
sitting in diversity cases are constantly admonished not to innovate and not to recognize
novel claims that have not previously been recognized by state courts.").
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For example, assume that defendants remove a class action to federal
court under CAFA's removal provisions. The class action's jurisdiction is
founded on diversity, so both Erie and the RDA require the federal court to
apply state substantive law. If the issue is one of first impression, no state
court will have addressed this precise issue. Consequently, the federal court
will decide the question, acting as if it were that state's highest state court.
The federal court's decision will be subject to correction by a state court in
subsequent cases. Yet, because CAFA in practice restricts jurisdiction over
class actions based on this legal issue to federal court, no case concerning
this issue will be ever be brought in state court. 264 As a result, there will be
no state decisional law relating to the underlying substantive law claims for
265
federal courts to apply in these cases.
Federal judges will, out of necessity, develop federal decisional law with
respect to these state law issues. 2 66 This both usurps the state court's role
as the primary creator and interpreter of state law and prevents federal
courts from applying state law as they are required to by the Act. If federal
judges apply their own federal decisional law in diversity cases, it may
violate the RDA. 267
4. CAFA and "False Federalism": The Application of One State's Laws to
Other States is a Consequence Inherent to the Federal System
Some critics assert that the Senate overestimated the harmful
consequences of False Federalism. It is true that in interstate class actions,
one state can apply its laws to out-of-state citizens. However, False
Federalism is a consequence of the Constitution's division of power
between the states and the federal government. 268 The application of one
state's laws to out-of-state citizens is not a federalism problem; it is a due
process problem.
Federal courts sitting in diversity are bound by Erie to apply the state
substantive law of the state in which they sit. 269 Thus, under Erie, where a
state court is constitutionally authorized to apply its own law or choice-of-

264.

See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1419 ("Although CAFA declared its

intent to leave Erie untouched, once national-market cases are jurisdictionally isolated in
federal courts, the need to develop incremental decisional law to address the particular
concerns of these cases will be inescapable.").
265. See id. at 1419-20.
266. See id.

267. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78. However, an argument can be made
that the Rules of Decision Act does not actively prohibit federal courts from applying federal
decisional law in the absence of state decisional law.
268. See Woolley, supra note 233, at 1735 ("[T]here was no basis for congressional
confidence that application of the law of a single state in multistate ... class suits invariably
violates the Constitution.").
269. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

1098

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

law rules to parties in an interstate class action, the federal court sitting in

270
that state is bound to apply that state's laws.

The due process limits of personal jurisdiction safeguard out-of-state
citizens from being unfairly subjected to another state's laws. 271 The Due

Process Clause 272 limits one state's jurisdiction over out-of-state citizens.
As long as the state court determines that an out-of-state citizen should be
subject to the laws of the state because she had a sufficient level of contact
with the state to reasonably expect to be brought into court there, that state
court may permissibly exercise jurisdiction over her. 273 The Supreme
274
Court has dealt with this issue in its line of personal jurisdiction cases.
The structural division of power between the states and the national
government permits states to apply their laws beyond their physical
2 75
borders.

The Senate's argument, that states were improperly applying their own
laws over corporations in other states' jurisdictions, is misguided.

False

federalism is not "judicial usurpation," 276 but is a necessary repercussion of
the federal system and its division of power between state and national

governments. States have the power to regulate activities occurring
within
2 77
their state, within the boundaries of constitutional due process.
III. CONGRESS IMPROPERLY PASSED CAFA CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF
DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE

This section adopts the views of CAFA's critics. Part III.A first argues

that Congress acted inappropriately in passing a procedural statute intended
270. See Floyd, supra note 11, at 657; Woolley, supra note 233, at 1769-70 ("Unless and
until Congress enacts a choice-of-law policy that governs class suits, federal courts will
remain rigidly bound by state choice-of-law rules."); cf Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
conflict of laws rule of the state in which it sits).
271. See Floyd, supra note 11, at 657; see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316-17 (1945) (due process requires that when a person or corporation is subject to the
jurisdiction of another state, that entity must have such "minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice'"(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1940))).
272. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. ");U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....").
273. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(describing the foreseeability requirement of personal jurisdiction: "[Thel defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there").
274. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
275. See, e.g., id.
276. S.Rep. No. 109-14, at 26 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26.
277. See Floyd, supra note 11, at 657 ("Of course, states are constrained by due process
limits that prevent them from applying their own law to transactions with which they have
no significant contact or relation. But where such a connection does exist, they are free to
apply their ordinary choice of law rules to transactions having interstate ramifications
without violating the Commerce Clause or any other provision of the Constitution."
(footnote omitted)).
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to affect substantive reform. Next, Part III.B contends that CAFA's broad
expansion of federal jurisdiction over minimally diverse interstate class
actions exceeds the traditional policy basis for diversity jurisdiction. Part
III.C then asserts that CAFA will compel federal courts to create federal
common law, which violates the Court's holding in Erie. Finally, Part III.D
closes with an example of a hypothetical class action that illustrates how
CAFA will, in practice, cause the aforementioned problems to arise.
A. Congress May Have Acted Contraryto Well-Accepted Democratic
Principlesin PassingCAFA
Congress may have acted anti-democratically in enacting CAFA. If
Congress wanted to directly enact substantive legislation governing
interstate class actions, it almost certainly could.278 The Commerce Clause
2 79
grants Congress broad authority to regulate interstate commerce.
Interstate class actions most likely "substantially affect" interstate
commerce, and thus it would be proper for 280
Congress to develop substantive
rules of decision for interstate class actions.
The problem is not what Congress did, but how Congress did it.
Congress chose to enact CAFA, a procedural statute, rather than directly
alter the substantive tort laws governing interstate class actions. 28'
Congress probably believed that it would be more difficult to enact direct
tort reform legislation. CAFA, a jurisdictional statute, was likely less
politically divisive than a direct tort reform statute would have been. Yet,
in practice, CAFA will have the same effect as substantive tort reform. By
shifting interstate class actions to federal court, Congress made it more
difficult for plaintiffs' lawyers to get nationwide classes certified. The
Senate acknowledged that it intended to change the outcome of class
actions that were being improperly certified by state courts. 282 Hence, the
Senate used CAFA to alter procedural rules that affect the substantive
28 3
outcome of class action litigation.
By using a procedural apparatus to change substantive law, Congress
infringed upon principles of democratic legitimacy. 284 Jurisdictional

278. See Macey & Miller, supra note 215, at 910; see, e.g., United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (outlining the limits of Commerce Clause regulation). Congress
could most likely regulate an interstate class action as business activity that "substantially
affects" interstate commerce. Id.
279. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generallyMorrison, 529 U.S. 598.
280. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
281. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 215, at 910 (arguing that Congress can
adopt substantive rules of decision governing interstate class actions based on its Commerce
Clause power).
282. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 5 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
283. See id. at 10-12, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11-13.
284. See Lind, supra note 197, at 720 ("1 assume three hallmarks of a genuinely
democratic system that should be noncontroversial: access to political participation,
transparency in the process of lawmaking (whether by legislators or judges), and lawmakers'
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statutes are necessarily arcane and complex. 2 85 It is difficult for many to
understand the significance of a change in a jurisdictional statute. 286 By
altering state substantive rules with a federal procedural device, Congress
has made the lawmaking process more opaque and consequently more
difficult for the people to hold their representatives accountable for their
2 87
actions.
Accountability is a key feature of democratic legitimacy. 288 In order for
the voters to hold their representatives accountable, they must be informed.
The citizenry needs to be as informed as possible about the major changes
that Congress makes that alter substantive rights. If the people do not
understand the consequences of CAFA, they will be unable to make an
informed decision as to whether they agree or disagree with their
representative's position.
For accountability to operate correctly, lawmaking must be
transparent. 289
When judge-made procedural law supplants state
substantive law, "accountability is a faint hope, for federal judges enjoy
lifetime tenure."2 90 If unelected federal judges apply procedural rules that
supplant state substantive law, it is undemocratic. Congress should
legislate directly and clearly. Had Congress enacted a substantive statute
rather than a jurisdictional statute, more citizens might have been aware of
CAFA's ramifications. This awareness might have spurred citizens to
participate in the democratic process by phoning their representatives to
express their disapproval of CAFA, or by voting their representatives out of
office in the next election.
B. The PrimaryPolicy Concern Behind the Diversity Clause Is Not
Implicated by Most Interstate ClassActions
CAFA also contradicts the framers' intent that the federal government
consists of only limited and enumerated powers. The federal judiciary
should only usurp state judicial power when there are serious national
interests at stake.
The main reason the framers chose to include federal diversity
jurisdiction in Article III was to prevent state courts from exercising
prejudice against out-of-state litigants. 29' None of the rationales that

accountability to the people for the consequences of their policy choices. Using procedure to
affect substantive law undermines all three.").
285. See id.

286. See id.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.B. 1 and accompanying text (discussing the policy rationale for the

Diversity Clause).
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Congress 2chose to justify the need for CAFA implicate this policy
29
concern.
Had Congress argued that minimal diversity over class actions was
necessary to prevent out-of-state defendants from experiencing prejudice in
state courts, CAFA would have been more closely related to the original
understanding of the need for diversity jurisdiction. 293 But with CAFA,
Congress was more concerned with the prejudice that one state's class
certification decision could have on citizens of other states. 2 94 Thus,
Congress's rationale for extending diversity jurisdiction over interstate class
actions was strained and unconnected to the purposes of the diversity
clause.
There are situations in which a defendant in an interstate class action in
state court will likely be subjected to prejudice. For instance, consider a
products liability case based on state law on behalf of a class of Florida
plaintiffs against an out-of-state car manufacturer and its in-state
distributors for defective design. It is likely that none of the tortious
activity took place in Florida and that the real defendant in interest 295 is the
mother corporation, yet the addition of the in-state subsidiaries destroys
complete diversity and would,
under the old class action regime, not be
2 96
allowed into federal court.
In this scenario, a Florida court would adjudicate a class action on behalf
of Florida residents against an out-of-state corporation. The risk of
prejudice against the out-of-state corporation seems readily apparent; the
Florida court has a greater obligation to the Florida citizens than a foreign
corporation. It is precisely this kind of prejudice that the framers intended
to alleviate by granting federal courts jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies ...
29 7
between Citizens of different States."
But there is no reason why a nationwide class action against an out-ofstate defendant based on state laws cannot be fairly adjudicated by a state

292. See generally S. Rep. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.

Congress enumerated several problems with state adjudication of interstate class actions,
such as the concern that plaintiffs' lawyers receive a disproportionate amount of settlements,
"judicial blackmail" of defendants by plaintiffs' lawyers, easy certification of class actions
by certain state "magnet" courts, forum shopping, and federalism concerns. Id. at 22-25,
reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22-25.

293. See Floyd, supra note 11, at 622 (noting that the traditional rationale for diversity
jurisdiction is protecting out-of-state litigants from prejudice in state courts); see also supra
Part I.B.1.
294. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 23-27, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 23-27 (questioning
the veracity under traditional notions of federalism of allowing one state to interpret other
states' laws).
295. See supra note 98 for a description of the "defendant in interest" principle.
296. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) (applying the
complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), to
only the named parties in class actions).
297. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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trial judge. 29 8 Prejudice against out-of-state litigants should not be a
significant issue, considering the fact that nationwide classes by definition
must fairly represent the nationwide class's interests. Furthermore, judicial
economy favors the resolution of nationwide class claims in one court
proceeding, rather than fifty different proceedings in fifty different states.
C. CAFA May, in Practice,Cause FederalCourts to Violate the
ConstitutionalHolding of Erie and Create Substantive Law
Congress, guided by the Erie Court's concern over vertical forum
shopping, enacted CAFA in order to create uniform application of interstate
class action laws. 299 Ironically, in effectively shifting all interstate class
actions to federal court, Congress may have gone too far in attempting to
prevent vertical forum shopping and may have forced federal courts to
violate the second constitutional holding of Erie.300
CAFA's effect is to create exclusive federal jurisdiction over some statelaw based interstate class actions. 30 1 Consequently, CAFA effectively
strips the state judiciary of its authority to create and interpret state laws
governing some kinds of class actions. 302 CAFA thus operates in
contravention of the constitutional holding of Erie.30 3
The Erie doctrine requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the
substantive law of the state in which the court sits. 30 4 Certain areas of state
law, such as consumer protection law, however, will never be interpreted
and developed by state courts. 305 Federal courts will be forced, out of
necessity, to develop their own substantive decisional law of interstate class
actions. 30 6 As a result, CAFA will force the federal courts to act outside the
scope of their constitutionally granted authority under Article 111.307 The
federal courts have no constitutional authority to develop rules of
substantive common law. 308 Thus, CAFA in practice will cause the federal
courts to act unconstitutionally, in violation of the Erie doctrine.

298. For examples of the kinds of class actions that the Senate considered unfit for state
court, see S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 38-39, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 36-38, which
outlines the difference between "national" and "local" actions, the former of which belongs
in federal court.
299. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 11, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12 ("This is not a
recipe for uniformity or consistency, it is fair neither to claimants nor defendants and it is
long past time for national policy makers to address class action procedures.").
300. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
301. See supra Part II.B.2.
302. See supra Part II.B.2.
303. See Erie,304 U.S. at 78.
304. See id.
305. See id.; Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1419-20; supra Part I.B.2.
306. See Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1419-20.
307. See U.S. Const. art. III.
308. See Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 17, at 1419-20; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See generally Woolley, supra note 233 (noting that CAFA may force federal courts to create
a federal choice-of-law common law, in violation of the Court's holding in Klaxon).
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D. A PracticalExample
An example can best illustrate how CAFA will, in practice, encourage
forum shopping, cause lawyers on both sides to engage in gamesmanship,
and force federal courts to create federal common law. Consider a recently
filed class action against The Home Depot stores in Florida for
overcharging 10% on tool rentals. 309 The Home Depot is an Atlanta-based
corporation, and the proposed plaintiff class is comprised of Florida
citizens. 3 10 Before CAFA, the plaintiffs could have added the individual
Florida stores as defendants to destroy diversity and have the case
remanded to state court. 311 After CAFA, the addition of same-state
defendants does not matter-the corporation and the plaintiffs' class are
diverse. Thus, minimal diversity exists, and defendants can remove this
3 12
class action to federal court.
The plaintiffs will then try to take advantage of CAFA's two
jurisdictional exceptions. The plaintiffs will first argue that the State
Action exception should apply, because greater than two-thirds of class
members are citizens of Florida. 3 13 The Home Depot, however, is a citizen
of Georgia for diversity purposes. The court is likely to determine that The
Home Depot is the primary "defendant in interest" and therefore that the
3 14
State Action exception does not apply.
Second, the plaintiffs will argue that the catchall exception should apply
and the federal court should therefore decline jurisdiction. This exception
requires that the judge find that between one-third and two-thirds of the
plaintiffs are citizens of the same state as the primary defendants. 31 5 The
plaintiffs will argue that the local franchises are the primary defendants;
defendants will argue that the mother corporation is the primary defendant.
The defendants will further argue that the proposed class of plaintiffs
should be expanded to include more non-Florida residents in order to
reduce the number of same-state plaintiffs to less than one-third of the class
3 16
and force the suit into federal court.
Because CAFA class actions generally involve interstate corporate
activities, defendants will generally be able to successfully argue that the
number of non-state citizens who should be in the plaintiff class is greater
than the plaintiffs assert. It becomes readily apparent how CAFA provokes
gamesmanship on both sides of class action litigation.
Assuming that the plaintiffs are able to tailor their complaints to avoid
federal court, fifty different state courts may have to adjudicate fifty
309. See Kay, supra note 15.
310. Id.
311. See supra Part I.B.2 for an explanation of pre-CAFA diversity requirements.
312. See supra Part I.C.2 (describing the alterations CAFA made to the removal statute).
313. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4) (West 2005); see also supra Part I.C.
314. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4) (stating that the defendant must be "a citizen of the State
in which the action was originally filed").
315. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
316. See supra Part I.D.
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different class actions, which are all based on the same underlying
occurrence. 3 17 This will lead to a "greater expenditure of legal resources
and [will] impose demands on a much larger number of courts. '3 18 It will
further risk "inconsistent judgments" and "strategic settlements" throughout
31 9
the nation.
CONCLUSION

Courts can take advantage of the § 1332(d)(3) jurisdictional carve-out
and construe CAFA narrowly when it comes to state actions or areas where
there is a substantial state interest involved in the litigation. Courts also
have the discretion to define the scope of the proposed class members. Out
of respect for the Erie doctrine, federal courts should interpret all of
CAFA's provisions with the goal of limiting federal jurisdiction over
diversity class actions wherever possible. Only those class actions that are
truly interstate in character should be adjudicated in federal court. The
states should remain the primary creators and developers of substantive law.

317. See Sherman, supra note 16, at 1607.
318. Id.
319. Id.

